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The O’Neill Institute for National and Global Health Law at Georgetown University is the premier 
center for health law, scholarship and policy. Housed at Georgetown University Law Center, in the 
heart of the nation’s capital, the Institute has the mission to provide innovative solutions for the leading 
health problems in America and globally—from infectious and chronic diseases to health care 
financing and health systems. The Institute, a joint project of the Law Center and School of Nursing 
and Health Studies, also draws upon the University’s considerable intellectual resources, including the 
School of Medicine, the Public Policy Institute, and the Kennedy Institute of Ethics. 
 
The essential vision for the O’Neill Institute rests upon the proposition that the law has been, and 
will remain, a fundamental tool for solving critical health problems in our global, national, and 
local communities.  By contributing to a more powerful and deeper understanding of the multiple 
ways in which law can be used to improve health, the O’Neill Institute hopes to advance scholarship, 
research, and teaching that will encourage key decision-makers in the public, private, and civil society 
sectors to employ the law as a positive tool for enabling more people in the United States and 
throughout the world to lead healthier lives. 
 
• Teaching. Georgetown is educating future generations of students who will become – upon their 
graduation – policymakers, health professionals, business leaders, scholars, attorneys, physicians, 
nurses, scientists, diplomats, judges, chief executive officers, and leaders in many other private, 
public, and nonprofit fields of endeavor.  The O’Neill Institute helps to prepare graduates to engage 
in multidisciplinary conversations about national and global health care law and policy and to 
rigorously analyze the theoretical, philosophical, political, cultural, economic, scientific, and 
ethical bases for understanding and addressing health problems. 
 
• Scholarship.  O’Neill supports world-class research that is applied to urgent health problems, using 
a complex, comprehensive, interdisciplinary, and transnational approach to go beyond a narrow 
vision of health law that focuses solely on health care as an industry or as a scientific endeavor.   
 
• Reflective Problem-Solving.  For select high-priority issues, the O’Neill Institute organizes 
reflective problem-solving initiatives in which the Institute seeks to bridge the gap between key 
policymakers in the public, private, and civil society sectors and the intellectual talent and 
knowledge that resides in academia. 
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OVERVIEW 
LEGAL SOLUTIONS IN HEALTH REFORM 
 
The American public has increasingly identified health care as a key issue of concern.  In order to 
address the multiple problems relating to the access and affordability of health care, President Obama 
and federal lawmakers across the political spectrum continue to call for major health reform.  In any 
debate on health reform, a predictable set of complex policy, management, economic, and legal issues 
is likely to be raised.  Due to the diverse interests involved, these issues could lead to a series of high-
stakes policy debates.  Therefore, it is critical that advocates of reform strategies anticipate such 
issues in order to decrease the likelihood that legally resolvable questions become barriers to 
substantive health reform.   In an effort to frame and study legal challenges and solutions in advance 
of the heat of political debate, the O’Neill Institute for National and Global Health Law at Georgetown 
University and the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation have crafted the “Legal Solutions in Health 
Reform” project.  
 
This project aims to identify practical, workable solutions to the kinds of legal issues that may arise in 
any upcoming federal health reform debate.  While other academic and research organizations are 
exploring important policy, management, and economic questions relating to health reform, the O’Neill 
Institute has focused solely on the critical legal issues relating to federal health reform.  The target audience 
includes elected officials and their staff, attorneys who work in key executive and legislative branch 
agencies, private industry lawyers, academic institutions, and other key players.  This project attempts to 
pave the road towards improved health care for the nation by providing stakeholders a concise analysis 
of the complex legal issues relating to health reform, and a clear articulation of the range of solutions 
available.   
 
LEGAL ISSUES V. POLICY ISSUES  
 
Among the major issues in federal health reform, there are reoccurring questions which are policy-
based and those which are legally-based.  Many times questions of policy and of law overlap and 
cannot be considered in isolation.  However, for the purpose of this project, we draw the distinction 
between law and policy based on the presence of clear legal permission or prohibition.   
 
Under this distinction, policy issues include larger-scale questions such as what basic model of health 
reform to use, as well as more technical questions such as what threshold to use for poverty level 
subsidies and cost-sharing for preventative services.  In contrast, legal issues are those involving 
constitutional, statutory, or regulatory questions such as whether the Constitution allows a certain 
congressional action or whether particular laws run parallel or conflict. 
 
Based on this dividing line of clear permission or prohibition, policy questions can be framed as those 
beginning with, “Should we…?”, and legal questions can be framed as those beginning with, “Can 
we…?”  The focus of this paper will be the latter, broken into three particular categories: 1) “Under the 
Constitution, can we ever…?”; 2) “Under current statutes and regulations, can we now…?”; 3)  “ 
Under the current regulatory scheme, how do we…?”  This final set of questions tends to be mixed 
questions of policy, law, and good legislative drafting.   
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PURPOSE AND LAYOUT OF THE PROJECT 
 
This project is an effort to frame and study legal challenges and solutions in advance of the heat of 
political debate.  This effort is undertaken with the optimistic view that all legal problems addressed 
are either soluble or avoidable.  Rather than setting up roadblocks, this project is a constructive 
activity, attempting to pave the road towards improved health care for the nation.   Consequently, it 
does not attempt to create consensus solutions for the identified problems nor is it an attempt to 
provide a unified field theory of how to provide health insurance in America.  Furthermore, this project 
does not attempt to choose among the currently competing proposals or make recommendations among 
them.  Instead, it is a comprehensive project written to provide policy makers, attorneys, and other key 
stakeholders with a concise analysis of the complex legal issues relating to health reform and a clear 
articulation of the range of solutions available for resolving those questions.   
 
LEGAL ISSUES 
 
Based on surveys of current health policy meetings and agendas, popular and professional press, and 
current health reform proposals, our team formulated a list of legal issues relating to federal health 
reform.  After much research, discussion, and expert advice and review, our initial list of over 50 legal 
issues was narrowed to ten.  An initial framing paper was drafted which identified these ten legal 
issues and briefly outlined the main components of each.  In May of 2008, a bipartisan consultation 
session was convened to provide concrete feedback on the choice and framing of the legal issues.  The 
attendees of the consultation session included congressional staff, executive branch officials, 
advocates, attorneys, employers, and representatives of a wide range of interests affected by health 
reform.  Feedback and analysis from this session further narrowed the ten issues to eight key legal 
issues which warranted in depth analysis of the current law.   
 
These eight pertinent issues are truly legal in nature and must be addressed in any significant reform 
proposal to avoid needless debate or pitfalls as policy decisions are made. There are multiple other 
legal issues that will arise as the discussion evolves and, if a federal policy is adopted, the system 
changes.  In this project, however, we have targeted the issues essential for an immediate discussion of 
federal health reform.    
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Prepared by the O’Neill Institute 
 
 
INTRODUCTION: 
Proposals to allow the purchase of insurance across state lines (PASL) have gained some 
support in recent years.  Health insurers have traditionally been allowed to sell a policy only 
within the state that approved and regulates that particular policy.  PASL would allow insurers 
to sell a policy approved in one state to people residing in any state.  
 
Any federal legislation to enact PASL in an individual insurance market would have to address 
two main legal considerations: 1) the McCarran-Ferguson Act, which allows the states to retain 
their regulatory authority over insurance, and 2) a constitutional prohibition against the 
commandeering of state officials by the federal government.  This paper outlines these 
obstacles and potential solutions, and concludes that as long as the legislation is thoughtfully 
drafted (see below), there is no significant legal or Constitutional barrier to enacting PASL.  
Additionally, the concepts discussed here may be relevant to any federal health reform 
legislation involving regulation of health insurance or the use of state officials.      
 
POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS: 
• Congressional Authority under the McCarran-Ferguson Act:  The federal McCarran-
Ferguson Act delineates the respective roles of the federal and state governments in 
regulating health insurance.  While states retain the primary role in regulating health 
insurance, the federal government can preempt state laws in this area if it does so explicitly 
and clearly, or if a federal law specifically relates to the business of insurance.  PASL 
legislation is most likely to  survive a potential court challenge to Congress’ authority if it 
includes both of the following two steps: 
 
¾ Clearly state that Congress is using its Commerce Clause power: Courts have 
historically been very deferential to Congress when it is legislating under its Commerce 
Clause authority, increasing the chance that the legislation would be upheld.  A clear 
statement of Commerce Clause jurisdiction in legislation would make this authority 
clear to the Court. 
 
¾ Ensure that the legislation meets the legal preemption standard: The legislation 
could expressly state that the law preempts state laws on the subject.  Alternatively, 
Congress could include clear language ensuring that the legislation specifically relates 
to the business of insurance, which would meet the Supreme Court test for preemption 
under the McCarran-Ferguson Act.  
 
• Commandeering of State Officials: The federal government is prohibited under the 
Constitution from requiring state officials to implement or enforce federal law, or 
“commandeering” those state officials.  However, the Supreme Court has ruled that the 
federal government can regulate interstate commerce, so long as state officials are not 
required to alter their actions as a result.  Congress can also attach conditions or 
requirements to federal money it grants to the states.  For a PASL proposal, concerns about 
commandeering challenges can be minimized by Congress’ taking the following steps:  
O’NEILL INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL AND GLOBAL HEALTH LAW 
GEORGETOWN LAW | 600 NEW JERSEY AVENUE NW | WASHINGTON, DC 20001 
www.oneillinstitute.org 
   1 
 
 
¾ Impose No New Duties: Congress should make the strongest case possible that any 
responsibilities modified by the PASL legislation do not impose new duties on state 
officials. Additionally, Congress could characterize the participation of states as 
“primary states” in PASL as voluntary.  
 
¾ Use Congress’s Spending Power: If Congress provides new funding to states to 
incentivize them to participate in a PASL program, it can rely on its Constitutional 
spending power and can attach requirements on the states’ participation.  Use of the 
relatively broad spending power can minimize any commandeering concerns. 
 
LEGAL ISSUES & APPLICABLE LAW: 
• McCarran-Ferguson Act: Ordinarily, where a state and federal law conflict, the federal 
law preempts (takes priority over) the state law.  The federal McCarran-Ferguson Act, by 
contrast, re-affirms the role of the states as the primary regulators of the insurance industry 
while preserving federal authority to regulate insurance if it acts specifically to do so.  If 
Congress wishes to preempt state health insurance law, it can explicitly declare that a 
particular piece of legislation preempts state law, or draft the legislation to fit under the 
exception provided by the Act for legislation specifically relating to the business of 
insurance. 
 
• Commandeering of State Officials: The Tenth Amendment and the principle of state 
sovereignty in the Constitution prohibit the federal government from commanding the 
states to implement federal law or policies that would interfere with state sovereignty. This 
is referred to as the “anti-commandeering” principle. A PASL bill could minimize this 
constitutional concern by characterizing duties of state officials as consistent with existing 
duties and by providing incentives to states through funding, as opposed to requiring state 
participation. 
 
CONCLUSION: 
PASL legislation can be implemented, if it addresses key legal issues using the solutions 
outlined above.  McCarran-Ferguson concerns can be addressed by carefully crafting the 
legislation with explicit references to the insurance industry, or by including a specific 
statement of preemption.  Concerns about the commandeering of state officials can be curtailed 
by drafting the legislation so that state officials are not given additional duties, and by 
providing financial incentives to the states to enforce the federal law.  Policymakers should 
keep in mind that the solutions above, in addition to being relevant to PASL proposals, may 
also be relevant to any federal legislation involving the federal regulation of health insurance or 
that requires specific action by state officials. 
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Legal Solutions in Health Reform: 
The Purchase of Insurance Across State Lines in the Individual Market 
Stephanie Kanwit1 
 
 
Introduction 
 
This paper analyzes the legal issues associated with the leading and much-debated proposals that aim 
to revitalize state regulatory competition and allow individuals to purchase insurance across state lines 
(PASL).  These proposals seek to reverse decades-old principles of state preeminence in the regulation 
of individual health insurance and instead create “jurisdictional competition” in the individual market 
by allowing an insurer to choose the state under whose law it wishes to be regulated, subject to certain 
consumer protections.  Advocates say this type of jurisdictional competition would reform perceived 
problems in the individual market and lower the costs of individual health insurance by imposing the 
regulatory authority of only the insurer’s selected “home” state.  
 
Supporters of PASL legislation cite the perceived advantages of greater competition, a reduction in the 
costs of regulation, and additional consumer choice.  For example, the health care reform program of 
the former Republican presidential nominee, Senator John McCain (R-AZ) featured a PASL proposal 
along with modifications to the tax treatment of employer sponsored coverage, tax credits, and funding 
of guaranteed access plans.2  In fact, legislation authorizing PASL was introduced in both the 109th and 
110th Congresses by Representative Shadegg (R-AZ)3, allowing insurers to select a “primary” state to 
govern the policy, but also giving a “secondary” state authority to enforce certain consumer protections 
as well as collect premium taxes.4 
 
In accordance with the ground rules for the Legal Solutions in Health Reform project, this paper does 
not take a position on the merits of PASL as a component of health care reform.  As we discovered 
over the course of the Presidential campaign season, the various supporters and opponents of PASL 
have articulated these views in some detail, and we anticipate further discussion of this approach.5  
Instead, this paper explores the legal as well as practical legislative issues associated with potential 
federal legislation to allow PASL.  Note that for space limitations, this paper focuses on the individual 
market for health insurance as opposed to insured group markets, although many of the same 
fundamental legal issues would apply.   
 
Part I summarizes the issues that PASL legislation seeks to address and discusses the current 
regulatory framework of health insurance to provide background as to how PASL could alter the 
regulatory environment.  Part II outlines these leading federal proposals, as well as touches briefly on 
analogous state efforts.  Whether these proposals can be implemented is addressed in the second half 
of the paper, with Part III discussing two basic legal issues that may arise from PASL proposals: how 
to draft any legislative language to both (1) avoid running afoul of the federal McCarran-Ferguson 
Act6, and (2) avoid improperly requiring state insurance departments to enforce new federal standards 
and thus possibly violating the Tenth Amendment to the Constitution, as well as solutions for 
minimizing these possible legal problems.   
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I. Current Regulatory Environment 
 
Today, more than 230 million Americans access health care coverage through their employers or 
through government programs such as Medicare and Medicaid.  Most non-elderly individuals receive 
private health coverage through health and welfare benefit plans sponsored by employers; in 2006, 
about 158 million non-elderly people were insured through employer-sponsored insurance.  A 
significant number, however, purchase insurance on their own in the individual market: one estimate 
puts the number at over 17 million in 2007.7  The number of individuals who are currently uninsured is 
estimated at over 45 million.8  The true intended audience of a PASL proposal will likely vary, 
however, depending on how and whether the proposal is linked with the offer of incentives or 
disincentives for employer-based coverage.  For example, some proposals – such as those offered by 
Senator McCain eliminating the favorable tax treatment of health insurance benefits provided to 
workers when coupled with a PASL proposal – could have the effect of increasing coverage in the 
individual market but only at the expense of diminishing employer-based coverage. 9 
 
Proposals to allow PASL are based on the assumption that state mandated benefits, state rating rules, 
and state regulatory regimes distort pricing and result in decreased uptake of insurance by price-
sensitive consumers in the individual market.  Under current law, companies may only sell policies to 
individuals who reside or work in the state in which the company is licensed (although large insurers 
license products in every state).  So, for example, a New Jersey resident has no choice but to purchase 
a policy from a carrier licensed in that state and that carrier can only sell that resident a policy 
compliant with all the state’s mandates as well as its guaranteed issue and community rating 
requirements.  But because of the variation in state requirements regarding guaranteed issue, mandates, 
and rating rules, as well as state demographics, there is a tremendously wide price variation in 
individual policies.  According to a recent nationwide survey, annual premiums averaged $5,326 for 
single coverage in New Jersey in the 2006-2007 period, but only $1,254 in Wisconsin.10  Contrast the 
cost of a New Jersey individual policy – $5,326 – with that of a Connecticut policy, where the average 
cost would be much lower, $3,326.  The national average cost of such a policy was $2,613.11    
 
A particular New Jersey consumer, however, looking to purchase insurance in the individual market 
might feel that the state’s extensive regulation was “worth it,” especially if he or she has medical 
issues, since no one can be turned down for coverage in the individual market, and the particular 
mandates for certain “high-cost” benefits will cause the cost to be spread out across a large 
community-rated pool. In contrast, the relatively younger New Jersey resident without health 
conditions might prefer a cheaper product rated for his or her individual risk as it would be in other 
states.  Supporters of PASL proposals argue a solution to this problem is to create a national market for 
individual health insurance to allow for greater competition by insurers, a greater choice in the types of 
plans available to individuals, and consequentially lower prices as a result of decreased mandates, less-
expensive rating rules, and a more favorable regulatory environment.12  Supporters point to historical 
analogies such as Delaware corporate chartering, dual banking charters, regional compacts for banking, 
the Risk Retention Act, regulation of surplus lines insurance, and association health plans.13 
 
Consumer advocates, on the other hand, are concerned lest PASL proposals have the effect of 
circumventing state consumer protections by producing a regulatory “race to the bottom,” with insurers 
selecting the least regulated state with the fewest mandates as their primary state.  Opponents further 
note the adverse consumer impact, in that insurers remaining in states with more mandates will 
necessarily be forced to increase costs as a result of individuals requiring those mandated benefits 
remaining in the secondary state’s pool.   
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The dissenting Democrats summarized their concerns with the Choice Act at the hearing before the 
House Subcommittee on Health in 2005 – namely, that the legislation would erode consumer 
protections, since “[s]tates would be powerless to stop out-of-State insurance companies from selling 
coverage in their State which did not meet important State consumer and benefit protections.” 14  The 
protections cited included access to emergency care and specialty care, mandated benefits such as 
maternity coverage, and enforcement of state fraud and abuse laws.  Others have reiterated that 
restrictions on state authority would probably create a greater risk of fraud and abuse, requiring a state 
(for example) to turn to the courts to shut down an insurance company regulated by another “primary” 
state rather than use the current more expedited administrative process. 15  There is also the problem 
created by a primary state’s regulators’ having to provide assistance to consumers living in a (much-
smaller) secondary state, such as the difficulties that might await a California consumer who buys a 
policy from a company licensed in Delaware and is then forced to seek protection from “a regulator 
some 3,000 miles away and staffed to regulate insurance markets on a much smaller population 
scale.”16 
   
The witnesses testifying in favor of the Choice Act, conversely, emphasized that the bill was indeed 
“pro-consumer” in that it provided an option for those who cannot “afford all the services and 
‘protections’ prescribed by their state,” in the form of mandates and community rating, for example.17  
These pro-PASL witnesses assured the Committee that the bill contained adequate consumer 
protections, including requirements regarding disclosure, requirements relating to the insurer’s 
financial stability, and the availability of an independent review mechanism.18  The testimony also 
noted the current reality of a mobile and decentralized workforce, made possible by the Internet and 
other communication tools, rendering state-based insurance regulation an anachronism in some 
cases.19 
 
Additionally, the Congressional Budget Office has weighed in since the Choice Act hearing in the 
House with a cautionary note: that the very virtue of any PASL proposal – its goal of increasing 
access to the individual market – may turn out to be its Achilles heel if it is not carefully designed.  
The increase in individual market uptake may reduce the number of people who are covered by 
employer-sponsored coverage, the CBO notes in its assessment of the Choice Act, since: (1) some 
employers (especially smaller employers) would stop offering coverage because individual market 
coverage would become less expensive; and (2) some employees with low health care costs might opt 
to purchase this less expensive coverage in the individual market.  Thus, the resulting increase in the 
per-person cost of the remaining employees in the group might cause employers to drop coverage. 20  
 
In order to understand the state “patchwork” of insurance law that PASL supporters are seeking to 
address, it is necessary to understand the historical framework of insurance regulation. 
 
A.  State Insurance Regulation under the McCarran-Ferguson Act 
 
States have historically had the primary role in regulation of insurance products.  This role was 
reaffirmed by the McCarran-Ferguson Act of 1945 (McCarran-Ferguson Act),21  enacted in response to  
the Supreme Court decision in United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass’n, holding  that 
insurance activity which crossed state lines was interstate commerce and  subject to the federal 
antitrust laws.22  Faced with the prospect of federal antitrust penalties for commonplace and arguably 
pro-competitive insurer activities, the insurance industry joined with the National Association of 
Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) to obtain passage of McCarran-Ferguson.  
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The Act had two aims: (1) to re-affirm the role of the states as the primary regulators of the insurance 
industry while preserving federal authority to regulate insurance through “specific” enactments; and 
(2) to provide limited federal antitrust immunity for the insurance industry.23  The relevant statutory 
language is as follows: 
 
(a) State regulation  
The business of insurance, and every person engaged therein, shall be subject to the 
laws of the several States which relate to the regulation or taxation of such business.  
 
(b) Federal regulation  
No Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede any law 
enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance, or which 
imposes a fee or tax upon such business, unless such Act specifically relates to the 
business of insurance: Provided, that . . . . the Sherman Act, . . . the Clayton Act, and 
the . . . Federal Trade Commission Act, shall be applicable to the business of insurance 
to the extent that such business is not regulated by State Law. 24 
 
While the Act specifies that “silence on the part of Congress shall not be construed to impose any 
barrier to the regulation or taxation of [the business of insurance] by the several states”, explicit 
wording in a federal statute could still allow federal law to trump a state’s authority to act. 25 
 
In response to the McCarran-Ferguson Act, states have developed comprehensive regulation of the 
“business of insurance,” including licensing, market conduct, financial solvency, policy language, 
underwriting standards, agent licensing, receivership, and (in some cases) pricing of coverage.  States 
have also used the limited antitrust immunity under the Act to develop various forms of rate regulation, 
often in the form of model laws developed by the NAIC. To protect consumers, all states have also 
adopted unfair trade practices laws to regulate not only insurer but also producer marketing and 
advertising activities. 
 
B.  State Regulation: Rating, Mandated Benefits, Regulatory Regimes 
 
The states’ authority to regulate health plans and health insurers is limited by federal law under the 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974  (ERISA),26 which specifically preempts any state 
regulation of employer self-funded group products and provides for uniformity in certain areas for 
group plans insured through state-regulated insurers.  ERISA does, however, allow the states to 
regulate the “business of insurance” and hence health insurance policies purchased by employers.27  In 
addition to ERISA, the states’ authority is also limited by other federal reforms – most notably, the 
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) – which created certain 
minimum insurance protections for both federally-regulated and traditionally state-regulated 
coverage.28  Two of its provisions are especially relevant: (1) guaranteed renewal, requiring that all 
health coverage (individual and group) be renewable upon expiration of the policy term;29 and (2) 
group-to-individual portability, guaranteeing eligible individuals losing group coverage access to 
coverage through individually-purchased insurance or alternatives, such as state-sponsored high-risk 
pools. 30 
 
But at the same time it imposed a “floor” of federal protections in certain areas on states, HIPAA also 
gave the states substantial flexibility in determining the mechanism for making coverage available to 
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those eligible and for enforcing the insurance-related portions of that federal statute for both the group 
and individual markets.  Thus, states could opt to apply the “federal fallback” approach or develop an 
alternative mechanism that: (1) offers a choice of guaranteed access coverage to all eligible 
individuals; (2) imposes no preexisting condition exclusions; and (3) adopts one of several approaches 
relating to risk spreading, including a standard high-risk pool approach (which includes a 200% 
premium cap) and any other approach that provides for risk adjustment, risk spreading, or a financial 
subsidy to eligible individuals.31   In most states, eligible individuals are guaranteed access to coverage 
in the state’s high-risk pool. 
  
That substantial flexibility left to the states by HIPAA – consistent with the primacy of state regulation 
of insurance – has left, and in some areas even increased, considerable state-by-state variation in, for 
example, how those risk pools work and  how effective guaranteed renewability is when coverage may 
be unaffordable.  The key driver to PASL proposals is to minimize that widely varying state regulation 
in the individual market, on the assumption that the divergence of state regulatory regimes imposes 
considerable additional costs for those purchasing in the individual market.  State regulation often 
involves more than one entity in the same state, as well as laws and regulations that are at significant 
variance with each other.  Supporters of state regulation, however, argue that such costs for state 
oversight – including market conduct examinations, corrective actions for insurers, and establishing 
state guaranty funds in case of insurer insolvency – are valuable, since they assure that individuals are 
best protected by local regulators and responsive elected officials.  
 
Under the various PASL proposals, health insurance issuers could offer individual policies of 
insurance from any state regardless of the residence state of the individual purchaser, subject to the 
primary state’s mandated benefit laws, rating laws (including community rating, for example), 
guaranteed issue, and guaranteed renewal laws.  The mandated benefits requirements and rules 
affecting the extent to which insurers may charge different prices for coverage offered to individuals 
are anticipated to have the greatest effect on the price of individual health coverage – assuming that the 
cost of care is constant across all geographic areas. 
 
The following is a short description of three key areas of state regulatory variation identified by 
supporters of PASL proposals: 1) Community rating and guaranteed issue; 2) Mandated benefits; and 
3) General regulatory regimes. 
 
1. Community Rating and Guaranteed Issue 
 
A minority of states have attempted to make health coverage more accessible in the individual market 
by enacting “guaranteed issue” and “community rating” reforms, which forbid age-based premiums 
differentials and medical underwriting for new policies. Under community rating, insurers generally 
are not allowed to vary rates based on the health or claims of a business or person, although adjusted or 
modified community rating can permit adjustments for such factors as geographic location and age.32 
“Guaranteed issue” requirements prohibit insurers from denying coverage to individuals based on 
health status, and currently five states require all insurers to sell coverage to all applicants in the 
individual market on a guaranteed issue basis.33  As a result of the passage of HIPAA in 1996, all 
insurers are required to sell their small group policies on a guaranteed issue basis, but in the individual 
market, when not linked with an individual mandate, such laws may encourage healthy individuals to 
remain uninsured until health care coverage is needed.  
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These reforms tend to create subsidies for older and/or less healthy individuals while resulting in 
higher premiums for younger/healthier individuals.  States with either guaranteed issue or community 
rating rules tend to have higher than average premiums because younger and healthier people are 
incentivized to avoid purchasing insurance until they become ill, allowing the insurance pools to be 
disproportionately represented by higher cost individuals. Supporters of these reforms contend that this 
subsidy is necessary to ensure accessible coverage to all regardless of health or age.    
 
In most states, premiums for individual coverage are allowed to vary by age, which can encourage 
younger people to purchase coverage, as well as by gender.  Likewise, most states allow insurers to 
medically underwrite new applications for coverage, which involves a process to assess risks and 
classify them according to degrees of insurability so that appropriate rates may be assigned to 
discernable categories of risk.  Underwriting can discourage individuals from waiting until they are ill 
to purchase insurance, thereby assuring the pool of insured individuals within each discernable 
category has a mix of those who are more healthy and less healthy, which serves to spread the risk of 
claims across the entire population, and assure more level premiums.   
 
2. Mandated benefits and access 
 
There are very few federal mandates on health policies in the individual market.34  States, however, 
have enacted a wide variety of laws mandating which categories of individuals must be covered by an 
insurer, which benefits must be covered, and which practitioners must be allowed to deliver medical 
treatment and services.  The Council for Affordable Health Insurance (CAHI) issued a report in 2008 
listing over 1900 state mandates applicable to individual and small group policies.35   These mandates 
can include: (1) provider mandates such as inclusion of chiropractors and acupuncturists; (2) benefit 
mandates such as the inclusion of prescription drugs, well-child care, infertility services, and hearing 
aids; and (3) covered classes of insureds, such as dependent students and grandchildren.   
 
Many forces drive the push to introduce and enact mandates, including guaranteed third-party 
reimbursement for providers and additional coverage for individuals with a particular disease or 
condition.36  Estimates of costs imposed by such mandates vary greatly.  CAHI has developed estimate 
ranges for each of the state mandates, ranging from less than 1% to between 5-10 % of additional cost.  
While the costs of a specific mandate may be low, the accumulation of 40 or 50 mandates in a state 
may price certain individuals out of the market.  Critics of mandates note that mandates ultimately 
harm consumer health by imposing static clinical procedures, despite the dynamic nature of changing 
clinical “best practices,” and by raising the cost of health insurance and thus contributing to the 
number of uninsured Americans.37 
 
A growing number of states, recognizing that mandates are not cost-free,   are requiring systematic 
review of either state mandates or of proposed mandate legislation.  The Massachusetts Division of 
Health Care Finance and Policy, for example, estimated the total spending on the state’s 26 mandated 
benefits at $1.32 billion, or 12% of premiums for the one-year study period (July 1, 2004 through June 
30, 2005).  The true net cost impact of mandated benefits, however, was estimated to be significantly 
lower (in the range of 3-4% of premiums) because of federal mandate laws and the likely behavior of 
insurers and employers in the absence of state mandates.38 
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3. Regulatory regimes for insurers  
 
States also vary in terms of the regulatory regimes they choose to impose on insurers in the individual 
market.  One area in which there is significant variation is in the area of external review – also known 
as independent medical review.  External review laws provide a mechanism for resolving health care 
coverage disputes between consumers and their health insurance plans by providing a formal process 
that allows an appeal of coverage determinations to a third party.  Currently, 44 states and the District 
of Columbia have external review programs that apply to private health insurance plans, usually in 
both the group39 and individual markets.40  
 
From an administrative standpoint, however, the scope of these state external review laws differs 
widely.  Some apply to medical necessity determinations,41 while others, for example, have external 
review laws that are broader and cover determinations involving experimental services or treatments, 
or even payment denials for providers.42  Other states, such as Arizona and Washington, apply external 
review to any adverse determination affecting coverage.43  Process requirements also vary widely in 
terms of time frames, the nature of the review, the qualifications of the reviewer(s), and whether an 
adverse decision is binding on the insurer. 
 
II. Leading Federal PASL Proposals 
 
PASL proposals attempt to solve the administrative complexities and inefficiencies that can arise in 
state-by-state regulation and help correct what proponents see as resulting distortions in pricing which 
may discourage younger and healthier consumers from purchasing individual insurance.  The leading 
federal PASL proposal is the Choice Act, introduced by Representative Shadegg in the last two 
Congresses.44  Companion bills were introduced by Senator Jim DeMint (R-SC) in the Senate.45  
 
In brief, the various versions of the Choice Act would amend the federal Public Health Service Act to 
provide that the laws of the state designated by a health insurance issuer (the “primary” state) would 
apply to individual insurance coverage offered by that issuer in the primary state and in any other state 
(“secondary” state), so long as the coverage and the issuer comply with the provisions of the Act.  The 
Act’s provisions would specify which types of state laws apply, thus requiring that the primary state’s 
law would apply to mandated benefit laws, rating laws (including community rating, for example), 
guaranteed issue, and guaranteed renewal laws.  To avoid duplication, the Act would give sole 
jurisdiction to the primary state to enforce its covered laws in the primary state as well as in any 
secondary state. 
 
The secondary state, however, would retain authority in certain specific areas: (a) levying 
nondiscriminatory premium and other taxes, (b) requiring compliance with lawful orders in relation to 
delinquency proceedings in the case of financial impairment, (c) requiring compliance with injunctions 
issued by the secondary state’s courts based on a petition that the issuer is in a hazardous financial 
condition, (d) allowing financial examinations according to NAIC standards if the primary state’s 
insurance commissioner had not done so, (e) requiring non-discriminatory participation in an insurance 
insolvency guaranty association, (f) requiring adherence to the secondary state’s law relating to fraud 
and abuse and unfair claims settlement practices, and (g) enforcing countersignature requirements by 
secondary state agents or brokers.  
 
The Choice Act also requires that there be a process in place for external review in both the secondary 
state and the primary state.  If both states do not have relevant underlying laws or regulations, then the 
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issuer must provide an independent review mechanism substantially identical to that of the NAIC’s 
Health Carrier External Review Model Act for all individuals who purchase insurance coverage under 
the Choice Act, except that the reviewer or panel of reviewers must meet requirements set out in the 
Act.46  
 
Senator McCain’s campaign proposal for the private market emphasized individual choice in the 
purchase of health insurance coverage.  Although the plan lacks detail, this author assumes it would 
have had substantial similarities to the Choice Act.  The McCain proposal sought to harness 
competition to improve the quality of health insurance with greater variety to match people's needs, 
lower prices, and portability and allow families to be able to purchase health insurance nationwide, 
across state lines.  Individuals who are not able to purchase insurance in this new regulatory 
environment or who face much higher premiums would be able (under Senator McCain’s proposal) to 
obtain coverage through a guaranteed access plan with a limitation on premiums and subsidies for 
individuals with lower incomes.47  
 
We should note that many non-federal approaches to the same issue of incenting individual choice of 
insurance product have been considered by state legislators.48  Rhode Island, for example, enacted a 
study bill this term that requires the Commissioner of Insurance to review the laws and regulations of 
the state and its New England neighbors to: identify the changes necessary to enable insurers licensed 
in other states to do business in Rhode Island without a separate specific license; analyze the 
advantages and disadvantages of creating a regional health insurance marketplace; examine  the extent 
to which obtaining a license is a barrier for new insurers to enter the market; and develop a proposed 
plan to implement a regional health insurance marketplace.49  Interstate Compacts may also provide a 
similar innovative approach, by which states band together either in particular regions (such as 
Northeast, South, Midwest, and West) or nationally.  One example of this approach in another 
insurance context is the Interstate Insurance Product Regulation Commission.  Thirty-three states have 
adopted compact legislation to establish the Commission which develops uniform national product 
standards and serves as a central point of electronic filing for certain insurance products, including life 
insurance, annuities, long-term care, and disability insurance.50 
 
III. Constitutional Issues 
 
For purposes of this discussion, the proposals that would alter the law to allow individual health 
insurance policies to be sold across state lines all effectively preserve the states’ primary authority for 
the regulation of health insurance while allowing Congress to set standards that modify that authority.  
Those federal standards would have a formidable impact, as noted above, on almost every aspect of 
state-regulated insurance markets, including mandates, guaranteed issue laws, and community rating 
requirements.  
 
As Congress sifts alternatives and attempts to craft health insurance reform, any PASL proposals (such 
as the Choice Act and Senator McCain’s) present two overriding constitutional issues:  
 
o Whether the federal government has the authority to regulate insurance so as to limit the scope 
of the McCarran-Ferguson Act. 
 
o Whether legislation allowing purchase of insurance across state lines could result in 
impermissible commandeering of state regulatory and enforcement bodies in violation of the 
constitutional prohibitions against commandeering. 
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This paper discusses each of these two issues in turn, as well as suggests possible solutions for 
minimizing constitutional challenges. 
 
A.  Issue #1: Whether the federal government has the authority to regulate insurance so as to 
limit the scope of the McCarran-Ferguson Act. 
 
As noted above, the McCarran-Ferguson Act reaffirmed the power of the states to regulate and tax 
insurers but allows federal law to trump state enactments if the law “specifically relates to the business 
of insurance”:   
 
“No Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede any law 
enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance, or which 
imposes a fee or tax upon such business, unless such Act specifically relates to the 
business of insurance.”51 (emphasis added) 
 
Some have questioned whether Congress can curtail the states’ ability to regulate in their respective 
individual insurance markets by enacting a PASL proposal.  This author notes that a review of the 
legislative history of HIPAA, which introduced significant federal regulation in areas previously 
regulated solely by the states, reveals that the Congressional drafters did not feel the need to amend 
McCarran-Ferguson before imposing federal rules on the individual market. 
 
1. Supreme Court Test 
 
Barnett Bank of Marion County, N.A. v. Nelson sets out distinct guidelines for assessing whether a 
federal statute overrides McCarran-Ferguson’s anti-preemption rule.52  In Barnett, the Supreme Court 
evaluated whether a 1916 federal law permitting national banks to sell insurance in small towns 
preempted a 1974 Florida statute prohibiting such banks from selling most types of insurance.   
 
In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Stephen Breyer, the Court engaged in a two-stage analysis 
to determine whether the federal statute preempted the state statute.  First, it looked to see whether 
under ordinary legal principles of preemption, the federal statute would preempt the state statute.  
Finding no “express preemption”53 and no “field preemption”54, the Court discussed whether federal 
and state statutes are in “irreconcilable conflict” based on the language and purpose of the McCarran-
Ferguson Act taken together.   
 
It found that the federal and state statutes were not in irreconcilable conflict – as they would be if the 
federal statute said “you must sell insurance” and the state statute said “you may not sell insurance.”  
Rather, a federal statute authorized national banks to engage in activities that the state statute expressly 
forbade.  Florida maintained that the federal statute was intended to allow the bank to sell insurance 
“only to the extent that state law also grants permission to do so.”  Rejecting that approach, the Court 
noted that “where Congress has not expressly conditioned the grant of ‘power’ upon a grant of state 
permission, the Court has ordinarily found that no such condition applies,”   and concluded that under 
ordinary principles of preemption, the federal law preempts the state’s prohibitory statute.  
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the business of insurance.”  First, it examined whether the law “relates” to the business of insurance, 
based on its historically broad interpretation of the term “relates” (giving as an example the “relates” to 
language in the ERISA preemption clause as analyzed in Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux55) and 
concluded that “[i]n ordinary English, a statute that says that banks may act as insurance agents, and 
that the Comptroller of the Currency may regulate their insurance-related activities, ‘relates’ to the 
insurance business.”56 
 
Second, the Court looked at the more “important” issue of whether the statute “specifically” relates to 
the insurance business.  In a plain language analysis, the Court distinguished between “implicit” and 
“explicit” references and contrasted the general term “business activity” with an explicit reference to 
“finance, banking, and insurance.”  
 
The third element of its analysis concerned whether the statute specifically relates to the “business of 
insurance,” with the Court noting that the statute not only focused on industry-specific selling 
practices, but also “affects the relation of insured to insurer and the spreading of risk – matters that this 
Court in other contexts, has placed at the core of the McCarran-Ferguson Act’s concern.” (preceding 
cites omitted).  
 
In sum, the court in Barnett confirmed that there is no need for there to be express statutory language 
in a federal statute to allow it to trump state law “regulating the business of insurance” additionally 
noted that this analysis does not require specific language such as “state law is preempted” or the like 
to fall within the McCarran-Ferguson Act exception.   
 
2.  Solutions for Minimizing McCarran-Ferguson Challenges 
 
In the event that PASL proposal or a variation is considered by Congress, its sponsors could minimize 
concerns about a challenge to the federal government’s authority to enact such a proposal by taking the 
following two steps:  
 
a)  State clearly that the Congress intends to regulate interstate commerce through the 
legislation.  The drafters should clearly invoke interstate commerce jurisdiction, as courts 
traditionally have been very deferential to the Congress when evaluating whether the federal 
government has interstate commerce jurisdiction.  
 
The very reason for the enactment of the McCarran-Ferguson Act was the Supreme Court’s expansive 
holding, in United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Assn., that “[n]o commercial enterprise of any 
kind which conducts its activities across state lines has been held to be wholly beyond the regulatory 
power of Congress under the Commerce Clause. We cannot make an exception of the business of 
insurance.”57   
 
While the specific lines of the Commerce Clause have shifted over the years, there appears little doubt 
of Congress’s power to regulate insurance, even if certain insurance activities were viewed as solely 
intrastate.58  Any judicial review of a statute would be subject to only “rational basis” analysis.59  
The Health Care Choice Act of 2007 included a specification of constitutional authority under the 
Commerce Clause: “This Act is enacted pursuant to the power granted Congress under article I, section 
8, clause 3, of the United States Constitution.”  Additionally, the Act included a findings section 
delineating the case for interstate commerce jurisdiction in order to set forth a basis for finding a 
“rational” basis for the linkage.60  The proposed legislation provided a “roadmap” finding section, 
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noting that (a) state law variations impact the ability of insurers to offer and individuals to obtain 
affordable individual health coverage, thus impeding interstate commerce; (b) the channels for offering 
coverage (Internet and mail) are part of interstate commerce; (c) the appropriateness of  increasing 
efficiency through a collaborative approach of states; and (d) risk-retention groups as a successful 
model for sale of insurance across state lines. This level of specification in federal legislation should 
prove sufficient to satisfy court scrutiny. 
 
b)  Ensuring that the legislation meets the standards of ordinary legal preemption in one of three 
ways: (1) express preemption (stating that the law expressly preempts state laws on the subject); 
(2) regulating the area so pervasively, that the law achieves “field preemption;” or (3) 
establishing the type of conflict between federal and state laws so as to establish a basis for 
“conflict preemption.” 
 
In the case of a PASL proposal, the drafters can achieve the intended result through either express 
preemption language or following the blueprint laid out by the court in Barnett Bank.  Any language 
should thus ensure that the legislation clearly (1) specifically; (2) relates; (3) to the business of 
insurance.  It does not appear that this test would be problematic for the Health Care Choice Act of 
2007 or the very similar McCain proposal.  So long as the proposal explicitly relates to “finance, 
banking, and insurance,” it will almost certainly satisfy the test.  The Health Care Choice Act of 2007 
recognizes this and provides such specificity, for example, in the findings section reproduced above.  
Likewise, the McCain proposal has an explicit statement: “An important part of [the] plan is to use 
competition to improve the quality of health insurance with greater variety to match people's needs, 
lower prices, and portability. Families should be able to purchase health insurance nationwide, across 
state lines.”61  
 
Second, because the term “relates to” is interpreted so broadly by the Court, any common-sense link to 
insurance in the legislation will likely be satisfactory.  Finally, the “business of insurance” prong of the 
test is likely to be satisfied on its face by the current wording of either the Health Care Choice Act of 
2007 or a proposal by Senator McCain. 
 
B.  Issue #2: Whether a purchase of insurance across state lines proposal would result in 
impermissible commandeering of state regulatory and enforcement bodies in violation of 
constitutional prohibitions against commandeering. 
 
A second legal issue with PASL proposals such as the Choice Act is whether they improperly require 
state insurance departments to enforce new federal standards.  Some have argued that state legislatures 
would specifically need to adopt these federal standards62 to make them enforceable under the Tenth 
Amendment to the Constitution, since the Supreme Court has held that “Congress cannot compel the 
States to enact or enforce a federal regulatory program.” 63 
 
The Tenth Amendment’s anti-commandeering language provides: “The powers not delegated to the 
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States 
respectively, or to the people.”64  That language raises the following questions:  
 
• Although PASL proposals “at first glance” appear to retain regulatory authority and responsibility 
with the primary state’s insurance commissioner and not compel new functions, would the primary 
state’s insurance commissioner be considered to be “commandeered” because the commissioner 
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would now have the added duty of enforcing standards for state licensed insurers issuing policies to 
insureds residing in other states?65 
 
• Would a secondary state’s insurance commissioner be considered to be “commandeered” by virtue 
of being required to monitor the financial conditions of out-of-state insurers selling insurance to the 
secondary state’s residents?66 
 
• Would recordkeeping imposed by such proposals – such as requiring the completion of federal 
forms certifying compliance with state law – be interpreted by a court as commandeering?67 
 
1. Supreme Court’s Anti-Commandeering Doctrine 
 
The leading case on “commandeering” is Printz v. United States.68  There, chief law enforcement 
officers for counties in Montana and Arizona challenged the constitutionality of interim provisions of 
the federal Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act that directed state law enforcement officers to 
participate in the administration of a federally-enacted regulatory scheme.  The legislation required the 
chief law enforcement officer of each local jurisdiction to conduct background checks of handgun 
purchasers until such time as a national system was in place.   
 
Ultimately, the Supreme Court overturned that requirement in a 5-4 decision with an opinion delivered 
by Justice Scalia: 
 
We held in New York69 that Congress cannot compel the States to enact or enforce a 
federal regulatory program. Today we hold that Congress cannot circumvent that 
prohibition by conscripting the States' officers directly. The Federal Government may 
neither issue directives requiring the States to address particular problems, nor 
command the States' officers, or those of their political subdivisions, to administer or 
enforce a federal regulatory program. It matters not whether policymaking is involved, 
and no case by case weighing of the burdens or benefits is necessary; such commands 
are fundamentally incompatible with our constitutional system of dual sovereignty. 
Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is reversed.70 
 
The door does not seem to be shut, on the other hand, for a reading that “voluntary compliance” by 
states or use of the spending power to urge state participation may pass muster.  Justice O'Connor's 
concurrence supports that view, especially coupled with the four dissenters' analysis that the Brady Act 
provisions were constitutional: 
 
Our holding, of course, does not spell the end of the objectives of the Brady Act. States 
and chief law enforcement officers may voluntarily continue to participate in the federal 
program. Moreover, the directives to the States are merely interim provisions scheduled 
to terminate November 30, 1998. Congress is also free to amend the interim program to 
provide for its continuance on a contractual basis with the States if it wishes, as it does 
with a number of other federal programs.71 (citations omitted)  
 
Another Supreme Court case may shed some additional light on how courts could evaluate a PASL 
proposal, if elements of a bill were deemed to regulate state activities as opposed to the actions of 
private parties.  In Reno v. Condon, South Carolina and its attorney general challenged the 
constitutionality of the federal Driver’s Privacy Protection Act (DPPA), which limits the ability of 
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states to release a driver’s personal information without the driver’s consent.72  The Supreme Court 
held that the Act was a proper exercise of the authority of Congress to regulate interstate commerce 
under the Commerce Clause.  Additionally, the Court distinguished Printz because the DPPA did not 
require state officials to enforce federal law in violation of the Tenth Amendment, but instead 
regulated the state as an owner of a database rather than attempting to control or influence the manner 
in which states regulated private parties.   
 
2. Strategies for Minimizing Anti-Commandeering Challenges 
 
In the event that a PASL bill is considered by Congress, its sponsors could minimize concerns about an 
anti-commandeering challenge to the Federal government’s authority to enact this proposal by taking 
the following steps:  
 
a) Make the best case possible that any responsibilities modified as the result of the legislation 
do not impose “new” duties on state officials. The drafters could characterize the choice of law 
rule as an exercise of federal preemption power under the Supremacy Clause.  Drafters could be 
mindful of characterizing the duties of primary and secondary state officials as consistent with 
already-existing duties of the official.  Any additional actions could thus be characterized as not 
constituting direct compulsion of the state officials.73  Another approach might be to characterize 
the participation of states as “primary states” in the program as a voluntary effort.74  
 
b) Provide new funding to the states from the federal government to establish spending power 
authority to incentivize states to participate in the program.  One option to consider would be 
to provide the states with federal dollars or incentives to participate in the program.  Congress’ 
spending power is broad, but not unlimited.  It is subject to the following restrictions: (1) the 
exercise of the spending power must be in pursuit of "the general welfare;" (2) if Congress desires 
to condition the states' receipt of federal funds, it must do so unambiguously so that the states can 
exercise their choice knowingly; (3) there must be a relationship "to the federal interest in 
particular national projects or programs"; and (4) no other  constitutional provisions may provide 
an independent bar to the conditional grant of federal funds.75   
 
Conclusion 
 
The various proposals to allow individuals to purchase and insurers to sell insurance across state lines 
are motivated by the laudatory goals of making health insurance more affordable by increasing 
competition among health insurers, giving consumers more choices of products and companies, and 
minimizing costs of duplicative or unnecessary regulation by 51 different regulators with varying rules.  
The constitutional difficulties appear to be surmountable if legislation is drafted properly.  But the 
practical difficulties of such an approach are legion. 
 
Fundamentally, by overturning the traditional paradigm of solely state-regulated insurance products, 
PASL proposals of all stripes create difficulties in determining what was heretofore a simple question:  
“Where does the policy live?”  The shift will necessarily impact all kinds of state assessments on 
insurers.  For example, over 30 states have implemented high-risk health pools, which are nonprofit 
organizations created by state law to offer health insurance to individuals who otherwise would be 
unable to secure coverage.  Because the premiums collected from participants in these pools fund only 
about 58% of costs, however, the vast majority assess health insurers for at least a portion of the 
pools’ funding, with formulas based on revenue generated in the state or on market share in the 
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state.76  Yet those funding mechanisms may be difficult to sustain in a state where consumers choose 
to “vote with their feet” and purchase policies issued in another state.  
 
There are additional practical problems about how PASL proposals would impact the myriad areas of 
extensive state-based regulation of not only insurers but also others working with them in the chain, 
such as state rules relating to licensing of brokers and/or agents, prompt pay requirements for 
providers, and provider adequacy and network requirements.  Thus, how can Maryland require a 
Colorado-based insurer to comply with Maryland network adequacy rules?  Should state prompt-pay 
requirements be enforced based on the residence of the consumer or based on where the provider 
service is rendered?  Any federal PASL proposal would need to contemplate how to address these 
difficult issues, and many papers have been published arguing the pros and cons of allowing 
consumers to buy insurance from outside their domicile state, and proposing variations on PASL 
proposals.77 
 
This paper has outlined a variety of other legal and practical issues that arise from a federal PASL 
proposal, many of which have been raised and vigorously discussed by consumer advocates, insurance 
commissioners, and academics.  Perhaps the overriding issue is how PASL proposals –which impact 
only the individual market – would fit within what seems to be a broader national effort to reform the 
health care system in terms of both access and affordability.  PASL proposals in essence attempt to 
simplify only one element of the health insurance regulation, by eliminating comprehensive (and often 
duplicative and variable) state-by-state regulation, while leaving in its place arguably less 
comprehensive regulation that may also be less protective of individuals from the “primary state.”  As 
the CBO has noted, these proposals may drive healthy individuals currently insured by employer-based 
coverage to opt for individual, less expensive coverage purchased from another state, leaving sicker 
and more expensive workers in the group coverage.78  Broader efforts at reform that address all 
markets – individual, group, and government-regulated – may be the better approach to reform.   
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